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Negotiated revolutions: the prospects for
radical change in contemporary world politics
GEORGE LAWSON
Abstract. This article is an attempt to rescue revolution, both as concept and practice, from the
triumphalism of the contemporary world. To that end, the article uses three transformations
from authoritarian rule – the end of apartheid in South Africa, the collapse of communism in
the Czech Republic and the transition from military dictatorship to market democracy in
post-Pinochet Chile – in order to test the ways in which these contemporary manifestations of
radical change compare and contrast with past examples of revolution. Although these cases
share some core similarities with revolutions of the modern era, they also diﬀer from them in
five crucial ways: the particular role played by the ‘international’ and the state, the nature of
violence, the use of ideology, and the process of negotiation itself. As such, they signify a novel
process in world politics, that of negotiated revolution.
The two faces of revolution
Revolutions, like the temple of Janus, have two faces. One is an elegant, abstract and
humanitarian face, an idyllic face, the dream of revolution and its meaning under the calm
distancing of eternity. The other is crude, violent and very concrete, rather nightmarish, with
all the hypnotic power, loss of perspective and breadth of understanding you might expect to
go with nightmares.1
From the time of the great exchanges between Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke
over the sanctity or barbarism of the French Revolution, scholars have disagreed
fundamentally over what John Dunn calls the ‘two faces of revolution’. For an
activist like Paine, revolutions were ‘a renovation of the natural order of things, a
system of principles as universal as truth and the existence of man, and combining
moral with political happiness and national prosperity’.2 Revolutions symbolised the
march of progress and rationality, of irresistible and irreversible change. But for
Burke, a staunch critic of the events of 1789, the revolution was nothing more than
a ‘monstrous, tragic-comic scene’ with potentially fatal consequences for the future
of Europe.3
In reality, revolutions neither fulfil the expectations of the romantics who advocate
them, nor become the dystopia feared by those who promote their overthrow. In
order to understand the significance of revolutions – in this age or any other – it is
important to cut a swathe through both of these myths: the exaggerated fantasies of
revolutionaries themselves and the claims of those, often conservative, thinkers who
1 John Dunn, Modern Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 4.
2 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, (London: Orion, 1993), p. 103.
3 Edmund Burke, Reﬂections on the Revolution in France (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2003), p. 12.
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deny the importance of revolutions to domestic societies or to international relations.
Revolutions do not start history afresh from a fictitious year zero nor can they be
reduced to mere trifles or footnotes in history. Revolutions have a formative eﬀect on
the particular societies where the changes occur and on the wider international
relations with which they interact. Yet, in reality, much of the new order is curtailed
by old-regime structures and many elements of the revolutionary programme are
never initiated in the first place.
In the present day, a great deal of the passion and drama that characterised the
great debate about the two faces of revolution seems strangely out of place. To all
intents and purposes, the age of revolutions has been consigned to the archives. Even
one of the theorists most attuned to the formative impact of revolution on world
politics, Fred Halliday, subtitles his most recent book on the subject, The Rise and
Fall of the Sixth Great Power. The term revolution has been reduced to a sound bite,
more often a means to peddle magazines, sell cars or spin policy proposals than act
as a call to action. Revolutions appear to have little place amidst the apathy and
weariness of mainstream political discourse in advanced market democracies. In an
era seemingly best captured by Fukuyama’s infamous phrase ‘the end of history’,
revolutions have been tamed and commodified, becoming irrelevant to a world in
which the big issues of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been settled.4
This article is an attempt to rescue revolution, both as concept and practice, from
the triumphalism of the contemporary world. There are two main reasons why it is
wrong to write oﬀ either the study or the practice of revolution. First, as Martin
Wight points out, over half of the last five hundred years have featured some kind of
conflict between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary states.5 From the ‘Revolt
of the Netherlands’ (1566–1609), to the ‘Springtime of Nations’ (1848), revolutions
have played a central, constitutive role in the making of the modern international
system. The twentieth century, perhaps more than any other epoch in world history,
was consistently punctuated by revolutions – social upheavals in the early part of the
century in Russia, Mexico, Persia and Turkey were followed by uprisings in China,
Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Iran, Nicaragua and elsewhere during the Cold
War.6 Indeed, much of the drama of world politics between 1945 and 1989 was
played out through processes of revolution and counter-revolution.7 As Fred
Halliday writes, ‘revolutions were not mistakes or detours but part of the formation
of the modern world’.8
Since the end of the Cold War, the dream of a new world order founded on peace,
prosperity and security has floundered in many parts of the world. A decade or so on
from the apparent triumph of Western market democracy, world politics is marked
by turbulence and instability. In the former Soviet states of Central Asia, a disturbing
mélange of oligarchs, mafiosos and former party cadres are carving up the spoils of
a failed transition. In Latin America, populists, past dictators and strongmen are
4 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992).
5 Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Penguin, 1978).
6 Using fairly demanding criteria, John Foran calculates that there were 31 revolutions in the
twentieth century. For more on this, see John Foran (ed.), The Future of Revolutions (London: Zed
Books, 2003).
7 Barry M. Schutz and Robert O. Slater (eds.), Revolution in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 1990).
8 Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (London:
Macmillan, 1999), p. 331.
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returning via the ballot box.9 Armed conflict continues to plague Africa, from the
Great Lakes to the Horn. In South-Eastern Europe, a decade of war has left a
devastating legacy on the social, economic and political landscape of much of the
region.10 Fundamentalist groups of various hues question the very foundations of
modernity.
There is, as yet, no concrete understanding or general agreement about the
predominant features of contemporary international relations. Questions loom large
over whether the world is operating under the suzerainty of an American empire, if
there is an imminent multipolarity marked by the rise of global institutions and
organisations, or whether the fundamental challenge of the epoch is a clash between
radically divergent views of modernity. Furthermore, the pressing concerns facing the
world – civil conflict, poverty, inequality, disease, social dislocation and environ-
mental degradation – hint at the continuing salience of radical change.11 Given, then,
both the relative openness and uncertainty which characterise the structural con-
ditions of the contemporary era and the persistent conflicts which mar world politics,
it seems strangely remiss to ignore the process which, throughout history, has had
such a foundational influence on world politics and which remains, both as aspiration
and practice, so relevant to the study and practice of international relations. Hegel
argued that the ebbs and flows of world aﬀairs tended to obscure, or even run
counter, to attempts at controlling (or theorising) them. Both the instability of
contemporary world politics and the eternal cunning of history make studying
revolutions a timely venture.
The second point about the importance of revolution to the modern world is more
theoretical. Many of those scholars who deny the importance of revolution to the
contemporary world do so because they mistakenly equate revolutions with certain
inalienable, essential features: class-based, violent, utopian and so forth. For the most
part, revolutions are ascribed certain core features, masquerading as objective
criteria, without which they are considered to be ‘invalid’. Such a view is misguided
because it reduces revolutions to static objects of analysis rather than seeing them as
dynamic processes with features that change according to their historical and social
9 This trend is best epitomised by the example of Hugo Chavez, a former Venezuelan paratrooper
who returned as president in 1998, six years after he had conducted an attempted coup, in order to
lead a ‘peaceful revolution’ against the ‘rancid oligarchs’ and ‘squealing pigs’ of the old regime. But
other examples are also pertinent – the former dictator of Bolivia, Hugo Banzer, was re-elected as
president in 1997. Since Banzer’s death in 2002, the country has witnessed a period of some
turbulence, exemplified by the coup in October 2003 against the regime headed by Gonzalo Sanchez
de Lozada. In Peru, Alberto Fujimori’s period in oﬃce ended in 2000 with his forced exile amidst a
welter of political and financial scandals. His successor, Alejandro Toledo, was forced to declare a
state of emergency in 2002 as a result of increasingly violent grass roots protests. The current
instability which mars Ecuador and Argentina, along with Colombia’s longer-term volatility, serve
as potent examples of the region’s unsteady milieu. For more on this, see Michael Shifter,
‘Breakdown in the Andes’, Foreign Aﬀairs, 83:5 (2004).
10 Although many states in the region, among them Serbia, Croatia and Kosovo, now bear the
trappings of formal democracy, the region remains mired in deep-seated problems from which it will
be diﬃcult to recover, not least among them the spectre of a return to populist, authoritarian rule.
11 There is also a demographic factor behind the continuing importance of radical change to the
contemporary world. As David Willetts points out, of the world’s twenty-five most youthful
countries, sixteen have experienced major civil conflict since 1995. The average age in China at the
time of the revolution was nineteen, in Iran at the time of the Shah’s overthrow, it was seventeen.
Conversely, of countries with the oldest populations in the world, only Croatia has experienced
serious conflict over the last fifteen years. For more on this, see David Willetts, ‘Too Many Kids’,
Prospect, October 2003, p. 18.
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contexts. The concept of revolution exists in every major language group in the
world – its heritage is diverse, drawn from a variety of cultural settings. As such, a
study of its etymology would need to include the Greek concepts of epanastasis
(revolt) and neoterismos (innovation), the Arabic terms inqilab (to rotate) and thaura
(to revolt), the notions of mered (rebellion), kom (uprising), marah (revolt) and kesher
(plot) in classical Hebrew, and the Chinese word ge-ming (change of life, fate or
destiny).12 In Europe, revolution – derived from the Latin verb revolvere –
traditionally evoked a return to a previous order, for example the restoration of
constitutional monarchy witnessed by the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688.
Over the last two hundred years, deriving in part from the work of Montesquieu,
Voltaire and Rousseau, the idea of revolution has become more circumscribed.
During this period, revolutions came to be seen as volcanic ruptures, quasi-
astronomical realignments, sharp breaks with the past from which societies could not
turn back. In this way, the English Civil War of the 1640s was reinterpreted as a
revolution during the eighteenth century, as was the Revolt of the Netherlands and,
later on, the American War of Independence. After the French Revolution, the
concept of revolution took on a kind of transcendental, metahistorical tilt that
universalised, naturalised and ultimately, mythologised, the revolutionary experi-
ence.13 The vision of a utopian future became inexorably tied to the concept of
revolution as did the notions of violence, and inevitable and total change. Each
generation of revolutionary scholarship subscribed to this essentialist view, in a sense
buying into the romantic fantasies of revolutionaries themselves. Rather than looking
for similarities in revolutionary ideology, advocates fetishised revolutionary rhetoric.
Rather than studying closely the relationship between violence and revolution, the
latter became associated only with glorious fights to the finish in which the old order
would surrender to the might and right of the revolutionary armies. Revolution
became an almost metaphysical category, an invented social concept that bore little
resemblance to actual experience.
Much of this ‘essentialising’ stemmed from a romanticism that equated revolu-
tions with heroic fights to the finish in which nothing less than ‘death or liberty’
would suﬃce. This disguised a much more complex relationship between revolutions
and violence than is usually understood. Often, revolutions have been relatively
peaceful seizures of power. Violence stemmed, for the most part, from battles after
the initial takeover of state power, resulting from the need by revolutionary regimes
to shore up their rule in the face of domestic and international attempts at
counter-revolution, a cycle that can be observed in France (in particular in the
Vendée) after 1791, Russia during its four-year long civil war after 1921, and in Iran,
by way of its war with Iraq and the brutal measures employed against the regime’s
‘un-Islamic’ foes after 1980. Nor have the revolutionary ideologies that ignited these
struggles always been the novel utopian visions that their champions proclaimed.
Third World revolutionaries from Mao to Castro, and Neto to Cabral have fused a
basic grounding in Marxism with a dash of nationalism, and an occasional sprinkling
of messianic, populist fervour. Even the leaders of the ‘great revolutions’ in France,
China and Russia looked to the past as well as to a vision of a pristine future in order
12 On this, see Halliday, Revolution and World Politics.
13 For more on this, see Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), and
Krishan Kumar, 1989: Revolutionary Ideas and Ideals (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota
Press, 2001).
476 George Lawson
to justify their revolt. To be revolutionary, therefore, ideas do not necessarily have to
provide some new set of original precepts. Rather, revolutionary ideology coalesces
around a fertile blend of the time-honoured and the novel, inspirations to action in
a given historical context. In this way, older ideals of freedom, justice and equality are
just as much part of revolutionary rhetoric as any claims of remaking the world anew.
Similarly, revolutionary victory has not been as total as is often imagined. Even the
paradigmatic revolution of the modern era in France was, to some extent, overturned
by the restoration of the Bourbons in 1815; many of the families who enjoyed
positions of influence under the ancien régime retained their privileges during the first
half of the nineteenth century.14 The ‘weight of habit’, institutions and moeurs of the
old regime became reinvested in the new order in France, as in Russia, Mexico,
China, Indochina, Iran, Nicaragua, Angola and elsewhere.
It is diﬃcult, therefore, to isolate any single characteristic that runs as a constant
through all instances of revolution over time and place: revolutions have been
conducted by nationalists, peasants, communists, radical military groups, liberals
and religious fundamentalists. Beneath the generic category of revolution lies
considerable variation in terms of the roles of violence and innovative ideology, and
in the overall outcomes of revolutions. There is not, nor can there be, any universal
quality or image that encapsulates this surfeit of characteristics. Revolutions are thus
better seen as dynamic processes with features contingent on both their world-
historical context and their particular social setting. As such, there is no theoretical
reason to suggest that revolution cannot take a contemporary form in keeping with
an era marked by globalisation and heteronomy. This form, I argue, is ‘negotiated
revolution’.
The term ‘negotiated revolution’ was first used in a book of that title written in
1993 by two eminent South African scholars, Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley.
It was further popularised in South Africa by the journalist Allister Sparks, who used
the term as the subtitle of his investigation into the secret talks between the apartheid
regime and ANC leaders prior to the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. Farther
afield, the Hungarian social scientist, Gustav Tökés, used ‘negotiated revolution’ to
describe the elite-controlled transition from communism to market democracy in
Hungary. Outside these two area-specific settings, the concept has featured in some
general literature on democratic transitions.15 This article both builds on and extends
this legacy.16
14 Tocqueville was so taken with this restoration that, writing in 1852, he claimed ‘nothing, or almost
nothing has changed since 1789’. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Ancien Régime and the French
Revolution (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 8.
15 See Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in
Post-Apartheid South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1993); Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is
Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution (London: Heinemann,
1995); Rudolf Tökés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996); and Michael Kennedy, ‘Towards a Theory and Practice of Negotiating Revolution’, Eastern
European Politics and Society, 13:2 (1999).
16 This article draws on a comparative research project into three contemporary transformations: the
collapse of communism in the Czech Republic; the end of apartheid in South Africa; and the fall of
the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. The Czech Republic is defined as having undergone a negotiated
revolution in a ‘maximum’ sense because of the systemic transformation of its principal political,
economic and social institutions since 1989. The South African case warrants the label ‘minimum’
transformation because some of the structures inherited from the apartheid regime (in particular
economic institutions), have been diﬃcult to break and remould. Chile is considered to be a case of
transition rather than revolution, negotiated or otherwise, because while some important social,
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Many theorists contend that ‘modern revolutions’, the type ushered in by the French
Revolution a little over two centuries ago, pass through a series of stages. Crane
Brinton, for example, bases his analysis of revolutionary anatomy on the path of the
French Revolution from an initial period of moderation to the ‘Terror’ of the
Jacobins and the ‘Thermidor’ of July 1794.17 Jaroslav Krejcˇí, in turn, argues that
revolutions pass through a number of stages: onset, compression, explosion,
oscillation, expansion, tightening, reversal, restoration and consolidation.18 In
numerous texts, Fred Halliday refers to the modularity of revolutionary outcomes as
constituting, in turn: a period of grace, domestic radicalism, accommodation and
instability.19 It is important to be careful about extrapolating in this way from one
revolution to another without recourse to contingency and particularity; if history
tells us anything, it is to be cautious when employing terms like generality and
necessity. Yet, there are some general features that can be extrapolated from modern
revolutions: causes rooted in systemic crisis; the development of a condition of
multiple sovereignty; a call to arms based on a utopian vision; a takeover of state
institutions; the attempt to export revolution internationally; counter-revolution; and
the growth of stronger, more bureaucratic, often tyrannical states.20 To somewhat
abridge a concept from Schumpeter, revolutions are processes first of creative
destruction and secondly of destructive creation.
Negotiated revolutions are like these ‘modern revolutions’ in three main ways.
First, they are conjunctural processes that take place when two conditions above all
are met: rulers can no longer rule and the ruled will no longer go on being ruled
in the same way. Vladimir Ili’ch Lenin, perhaps the archetypal revolutionary,
understood this well:
The fundamental law of revolution is as follows: for a revolution to take place it is not enough
for the exploited and the oppressed masses to realise the impossibility of living in the old way;
for a revolution to take place it is essential that the exploiters should not be able to live and
rule in the old way. It is only when the lower classes do not want to live in the old way and the
upper classes cannot carry on in the old way that the revolution can triumph.21
Revolutions are rooted in both long-term trends and short-term sparks, complex
amalgams of systemic crisis, structural opening and collective action. Revolutions
come about through a multiplicity of long-term and short-term factors, including
political and economic changes have taken place since 1989, these have largely been contained
within the ‘authoritarian enclaves’ prescribed by the outgoing junta. These three cases are used in
this article as the principal empirical material by which to test and illustrate the theoretical claims.
George Lawson, Negotiated Revolutions: The Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2005). On the ‘maximum’ and ‘minimum’ dimensions of revolutionary change, see Eric
Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973).
17 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1965).
18 Jaroslav Krejcˇí, Great Revolutions Compared: The Outline of a Theory (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1994).
19 See, for example, Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994),
Chapter 6.
20 Even within such a loose taxonomy, there are still exceptions. For example, the Mexican Revolution
was an uprising against an authoritarian regime rather than a movement for an alternative utopian
future, at least until the intervention of Lázaro Cárdenas del Río and his nationalisation drive
during the late 1930s.
21 Vladimir Ili’ch Lenin, On Culture and Cultural Revolution (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970),
p. 94.
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international, economic, political and social factors. For John Foran, understanding
revolutions in this way, as conjunctural phenomena, characterises ‘fourth generation’
approaches to the study of revolutions.22
Second, although as pointed out above, revolutions take on various forms
according to time and place, they do share a sociological logic. Rather than
focusing on ascribed characteristics that can only deliver a static snap-shot of
particular cases of revolution without comparative purchase, fourth-generation
approaches adopt a sociological, dynamic understanding of revolution that entails
focusing on the underlying processes that hold constant for both modern and
contemporary cases. In this way, revolutions can be seen as: the rapid, mass,
forceful, systemic transformation of a society’s principal institutions and organisa-
tions.23 Revolutions are systemic in the sense that they are processes in which the
major institutions and organisations in a society are transformed. Ways of doing
business and competing politically must change alongside shifts in values and
attitudes if an example of radical change is truly to warrant the name revolution.
Revolutions are not merely about the introduction of elections, the privatisation of
one or two industries or the opening up of media outlets to allow mild critiques of
the status quo – they are something much more fundamental and comprehensive.
Revolutions seek to overturn a society’s social, economic and political structures,
and recast its international relations, all within a relatively short time-frame. This
diﬀerentiates revolutions from evolutionary change that is comprehensive but takes
place over the long-term, reform programmes that take place in the short-term but
do not engender fundamental change, and transitions which see only a partial
modification of a society’s main institutions and organisations, and take place over
a medium-term time-frame.24 In other words, revolutions can be diﬀerentiated
from other processes of social change primarily by their scope, depth and eﬀect.25
Revolutions are processes rooted both in the longue durée, which provides the
seeds for the revolutionary crisis to emerge, and are caused by short-term triggers
which ignite the revolutionary process. In this sense, revolutions both ‘happen’
and are ‘made’ – an ‘organic crisis’ joins with purposive action in the development
of a revolutionary situation, in the playing out of revolutionary events and in
determining a revolution’s outcomes.26 One must be prepared to delve around the
22 John Foran, ‘Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Towards a Fourth Generation’? Sociological
Review, 11:1 (1993). The idea of there being an evolution to the study of revolutions with each
generation building usefully on the insights of the last, stems from an article by Lawrence Stone:
Lawrence Stone, ‘Theories of Revolution’, World Politics, 18:2 (1966). Also see Lawson, Negotiated
Revolutions, ch. 2.
23 Institutions and organisations are oﬀered as a ‘middle-level’ analysis capable of unravelling and
evaluating revolutionary transformations. For more on this, see Lawson, Negotiated Revolutions,
ch. 1.
24 For more on this, see Alexander J. Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999). A useful diﬀerentiation is made by James Rosenau, who distinguishes
between ‘personnel wars’ that take place for control of the government, ‘authority wars’ that lead to
a change of regime, and structural wars or social revolutions, which encompass a much broader
transformation of power relations. James N. Rosenau, International Aspects of Civil Strife
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964).
25 For more on this, see Piotr Sztompka, The Sociology of Social Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
26 The notion of ‘organic crisis’ is drawn from Gramsci. For Gramsci, revolutions take place in an era
in which, ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of
morbid symptoms appear’. Cited in Colin Bundy, ‘History, Revolution and South Africa’,
Inaugural Lecture given at the University of Cape Town, 17 June 1987, p. 7.
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historical archives as well as revel in the drama of revolutionary events themselves
if one is to understand why revolutions take place where and how they do.
To constitute a revolution, systemic change must, at least in part, be the result of
a significant contribution from social movements in civil society and substantially
involve the wider public. Although led by an elite, revolutions are mass events in
which the population is prepared to defy the old regime and overturn the existing
order. This distinguishes revolutions from processes of reform from above, palace
coup or putsch. Lenin and Castro may have seized power with only a handful of
well-armed, committed revolutionaries, but their regimes were supported and
sustained by popular legitimacy, at least in the short- to medium-term (although in
both cases, the iron fist of dictatorship was never too far from the surface).
Revolutionary regimes are propped up by consensus as well as by force. In contrast,
the so-called ‘Bolivarian Revolution’ initiated by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, like
those conducted by other members of the oﬃcer corps throughout the developing
world, is better understood as a coup rather than a revolution precisely because it
lacks suﬃcient popular support, is relatively limited in its aims and is hemmed in by
embedded, structural forces. Similarly the shallowness, partiality and uncertain
long-term eﬀects of Indonesia’s so-called ‘quiet revolution’ and President George W.
Bush’s ‘revolution in foreign policy’ indicates that they should be considered as
something other than revolutions.27
The third similarity between negotiated revolutions and modern revolutions is
their constitutive eﬀect on world politics. Revolutions have always been international
events – revolutionaries follow the example of other transformations, the vision of
revolutionaries cares little for national boundaries and all revolutionaries seek to
export revolution abroad. Goals of world revolution may rarely, in practice, be either
attempted or achieved, as strategic calculations about the availability of scarce
resources and alternative ideologies like nationalism impede the spread of revolu-
tions. But even as aspirations, revolutions play influential roles in the growth of
protest movements, rebellions, coups and reform overseas.28 The French Revolution,
for example, introduced into the public domain concepts like ‘nationalism’, ‘left’ and
‘right’, and what Eric Hobsbawm calls its ‘most lasting and universal consequence’ –
the metric system.29 Although the initial direction of the revolutionary programme
was subverted by Robespierre’s ‘Terror’ and Napoleonic dictatorship, its impact
travelled far and wide: counter-revolutionary alliances were formed to crush the
revolution; other uprisings were carried out in its name; reform programmes were
initiated to prevent revolutions taking place elsewhere. Revolutions, both as concept
and practice, aﬀect the very nature of the international system.
Negotiated revolutions share this formative impact on world politics. By embracing
the norms, rules and operating procedures of advanced market democracies – the
formation of liberal constitutions and free elections, the liberalisation of economic
relations, the establishment of a free press and so on – negotiated revolutions
strengthen the legitimacy of market democracy both as an aspirational project and as a
27 For contrasting views, see Lex Rieﬀel, ‘Indonesia’s Quiet Revolution’, Foreign Aﬀairs, 83:5 (2004),
and Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign
Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
28 For more on this, see Halliday, Revolution and World Politics.
29 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London: Abacus,
1994).
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tangible goal. Also, as exemplars of a novel form of revolutionary change, negotiated
revolutions stand as paradigmatic models of radical change, as ‘great revolutions’ with
potentially deep lessons for those states sharing similar problems or going through
comparable processes. One only has to look at the level of attention paid to South
Africa’s transformation to see its appeal as a model of radical change.30 However,
crucially, negotiated revolutions also challenge some of the very foundations of
contemporary world politics. Negotiated revolutions aptly demonstrate the follies of a
fundamentalist belief in the good of the market (rising inequality and unemployment)
and the dangers which come from failing to support nascent social and political
institutions (an increase in extremism, corruption, a legitimacy gap between elites and
civil society). This point is well illustrated by the example of the Czech Republic.
In the Czech Republic, the opening up of the economy through privatisation and
liberalisation programmes has produced uneven results: an initial drop in GDP
followed by a sudden period of growth before a second tailing oﬀ and the return of
more steady, if slower, growth. This series of lurches has led to a rise in unemploy-
ment as the state and the business sector have struggled to come to terms with the
demands of a relatively unrestricted market economy.31 Perhaps as a result, there has
been a concomitant increase in corruption. Indeed, a welter of corruption scandals
has plagued the Czech government since 1989. A prime example is the case of
Jaroslav Lizner, a businessman who not only ran the main privatisation scheme
conducted by the state during the early- mid-1990s but also headed a leading private
investment fund at the same time. Lizner was found with Kr 8.3 m (over
US$ 300,000) cash in a briefcase for use as a bribe to enable his company to buy a
stake in a leading dairy enterprise. Lizner did not deny the charges, instead pointing
out that such a deal was normal practice, a facilitation fee for services rendered. In
2002, a senior oﬃcial in the Foreign Ministry, Karel Srba, was found with over
$750,000 cash in his apartment, gains from a shady property deal. According to the
World Bank, a quarter of Czech firms frequently pay ‘irregular unoﬃcial payments
to get things done’.32 In 2003, an EU accession team reported that corruption was ‘a
serious cause for concern’.33
Furthermore, one of the unintended consequences of the move to market-
democracy in the Czech Republic has been the destruction of old, informal networks
of support. Where once an extended family provided childcare or a neighbour
supplied cheap goods, an individualistic culture has emerged in which social relations
have been formalised and routinised. As the transition has become more painful, so
levels of social capital have declined. Trust in the new Czech Republic has fallen
markedly: in January 1991, 71 per cent of Czechs said they trusted parliament but by
2003, this support had dropped to 29 per cent; Czechs have the lowest trust in the
region in the military and the judicial system.34
30 Similarly, one only has to look at the failings of the ‘transitions from above’ in Afghanistan and
Iraq to draw parallel cautionary lessons.
31 For example, in the Czech Republic, unemployment rose from a statistically redundant 0.8 per cent
of the working population in 1990 to over 10 per cent in 2003.
32 World Bank, Czech Republic: Completing the Transformation of Banks and Enterprises (Washington,
DC: World Bank, 2002). It is worth noting that the comparable figures for Poland and Hungary are
33 per cent and 31 per cent respectively. However, in Slovenia the figure is as low as 8 per cent.
33 Europa Publications, Central and South Eastern Europe (London: Europa, 2003).
34 Figures taken from Economist Intelligence Unit, The Czech Republic: Country Proﬁle (London:
EIU, 2004).
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The collapse of communism has provided fertile ground for the growth of racism
in the Czech Republic. The removal of old certainties aﬀorded by the restrictive shell
of communism has allowed previously submerged and latent prejudices to bubble to
the surface. Fuelled by worsening economic conditions during the mid- to late-1990s,
the strong electoral performance of the neo-fascist Republican Party and the rise of
publications like Politika, a focal point for anti-semitic writing, racism has emerged
as a pervasive problem in the post-communist era. During the 1990s, there were over
1,500 violent attacks reported by skinheads against Roma, resulting in 30 deaths. The
Secretary of the Republican Party, Jan Vik, makes no apology for such actions,
‘Roma murder, rape and rob decent people. It is high time to resolutely stop the
raving of these black racists who are acting as parasites to the detriment of the whole
society.’35 In 1998, the mayor of Usti’Nad Labem announced plans to build a wall
around a Roma housing complex on the grounds that it was necessary ‘to separate
the decent people from those who are not’.36 In 1999, the leader of the Republican
Party, Miroslav Sladek oﬀered a car to the Czech mayor most successful at expelling
Roma from their town. Half of all Czechs favour the expulsion of Roma from the
Czech Republic and another third want Roma to be isolated or concentrated in
particular areas; 87 per cent say they would mind Roma living in their neighbour-
hoods.37 Such views are given further credence by oﬃcial policy. The Citizenship Law
of 1993 deemed 100,000 Roma to be stateless through retroactive residency require-
ments and demands that Czech citizens have clean criminal records. In the mid-1990s,
62 per cent of the police force said that they thought racially motivated crimes were
provoked by Roma themselves. Those crimes that are investigated rarely end in
prosecutions.
As Erin Jenne writes, the result of this oﬃcial and privately held prejudice has been
the construction of a Roma ‘ethnoclass’.38 Roma are heavily discriminated against in
the workplace and over-represented in a range of negative social categories, from
unemployment rates to residency of mental asylums. Recent government figures
found that Roma unemployment was anywhere between 70 and 90 per cent, and that
nearly three-quarters of Roma children were being educated in schools for the
mentally handicapped. The infant mortality rate for Roma is twice that of the
national average while Roma life expectancy as a whole is ten years below that for
white Czechs.39 It was therefore little surprise that in 1997, many Roma seized the
chance to emigrate en masse to Canada following the lifting of visa restrictions. Over
1,000 were admitted in the six months before requirements were reintroduced; 800
more were allowed to enter the UK in 1998 on the basis of racial discrimination.
In these three ways, therefore, negotiated revolutions like that in the Czech
Republic are comparable to the ‘great revolutions’ of the modern era – the changes
they provoke are fundamental, if not always desirable. But, importantly, negotiated
revolutions move away from the prevalent patterns associated with modern revolu-
tions in five main ways. From a suspicion of revolution which frequently led to
35 Rick Fawn, ‘Czech Attitudes to the Roma’, Europe-Asia Studies, 53:8 (2001).
36 John Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratisation (London: Sage, 1999), p. 159.
37 For more on these polls, see Robin Shepherd, Czechoslovakia: The Velvet Revolution and Beyond
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
38 Erin Jenne, ‘The Roma of Eastern and Central Europe: Constructing a Stateless Nation’, in
Jonathan R. Stein (ed.), The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe
(London: M. E. Sharpe, 2000).
39 Economist Intelligence Unit, Czech Republic: Country Proﬁle.
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counter-revolution, the international, both in terms of structure and agency, actively
welcomes the insurgent states. The utopian vision that often resulted in extremism is
exchanged for a revolutionary ideology rooted in longer-term principles of freedom,
a return to normalcy and a desire to ‘catch up’ with other states. A violent conflict
between rival forces is replaced by the acceptance of mutual dependency, the
undesirability of ongoing civil conflict and a greater role for structural, latent forms
of violence. From a fight to the finish comes a process in which the old regime and
revolutionaries together negotiate the destruction of the old order and the birth of a
new nation. Rather than the creation of a stronger, more bureaucratic state, a
relatively weak state emerges both in terms of despotic authority and infrastructural
capacity, hemmed in by independent actors, both national and international. As
such, negotiated revolutions are tangible signs of an imminent modularity in world
politics in which radical change is based around the idea of liberation rather than the
dream of utopia.
From Burke to Paine
Revolutions are intricately bound up with the international. First, they are, to an
extent, reliant on international context. During the Cold War, for example, a
relatively impermeable operating environment tended to foreclose opportunities for
revolutionary change. Any disruption to the status quo was considered, usually by
both blocs, as a hazardous disruption to the global constellation of forces. In this
way, the United States favoured authoritarian strongmen, most noticeably in the
Americas, even at the cost of democratically elected heads of state. For their part, the
Soviet Union rarely intervened openly to help even apparent allies in the developing
world, at least at nothing like the level of assistance oﬀered by, for example, Fidel
Castro in Cuba.40 Over the past two centuries, international statesmen and diplomats
whatever their overt political stripes have tended to view revolutions with Burkean
suspicion, often backed up by active support for counter-revolutionary measures.41
Order, time and again, has trumped demands for justice.
However, the end of the Cold War led to an opening up of this closed international
order and removed many of the negative connotations associated with revolutionary
change. The apparent ‘triumph’ of market democracy and the collapse of a viable
alternative system acted as a spur for radical change around the world. As long as
revolutionaries framed their story as one of a return to normalcy (Chile), emancipa-
tion from the Soviet yoke (the Czech Republic) or as liberation from a system whose
time had long since past (South Africa), as long as they agreed to abide by a series
40 There is increasing evidence, however, that the Soviet Union supported revolutions in the
developing world covertly. At a seminar held at the London School of Economics in November
2003, Vladimir Shubin, a Russian expert on Southern Africa, claimed that the Soviet Union was
involved in nineteen conflicts in the Third World during the Cold War.
41 The importance of counter-revolution lies in what Philip Windsor calls ‘the vulnerability of the
great powers’. In order to maintain their position, status and credibility, great powers are forced to
quell moments of disorder, intervening in order to demonstrate their steadfastness against threats to
their hegemony. This ‘system-pressure’ is, as Windsor points out, a kind of ‘weakness-in-strength’.
For a fuller discussion of this, see Nick Bisley, ‘Counter-Revolution, Order and International
Politics’, Review of International Studies, 30:1 (2004).
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of neo-liberal reforms and signed up to a welter of international institutions and
normative frameworks, so the great powers welcomed what had previously been
outcast states into the community of nations. Burkean suspicion was supplanted by
an almost Paine-like enthusiasm. Just cause was given a rare opportunity for
realisation.
International assistance for negotiated revolutions varied from the normative (the
recognition of the legitimacy of the revolutionary struggle) to the material (aid
packages, election monitors and so on). The revolutionary transformations in the
Czech Republic and South Africa succeeded because of the structural opening
aﬀorded by the end of the Cold War and the active support of international
agencies – state departments, key individuals and global institutions alike. In Chile,
the international played a major role in the transition, witnessed for example by the
example eﬀect of democratisation in neighbouring states, the US government’s
partial funding for the ‘No’ campaign against the dictatorship and the pressure
applied by Washington on the junta to accept the result of the 1988 plebiscite on
whether the military regime should stand down.
One of the striking elements of negotiated revolutions is the transformation which
they induce in foreign policymaking. Rather than building up armies in order to
shore up their regimes from internal and external enemies, both the Czech Republic
and South Africa have sought to join and strengthen international institutions,
regimes and organisations. In the Czech Republic, post-revolutionary foreign policy
has turned firmly to the West. In June 1991, the Czech Republic joined the Council
of Europe, an organisation whose members had to be committed to free elections and
the rule of law. In October 1993, an Association Agreement with the EU was signed,
marking the onset of negotiations leading towards eventual membership of the
Union. In October 1995, the Czech Republic became an oﬃcial Associate Member of
the EU and in 1996, an application for full membership was lodged. The Czech public
voted overwhelmingly in favour of joining the union in a referendum held in June
2003 and accession procedures were completed in May 2004.42 Likewise, after joining
NATO in March 1999, the government committed Czech troops to specialist work
and peacekeeping roles in hotspots around the world. In February 2004, 100 Czech
special forces launched the first combat mission conducted by Czech forces since
World War II in Afghanistan.
Between 1948 and 1994, apartheid South Africa practised what Peter Schraeder
describes as ‘the diplomacy of isolation’.43 Since 1994, South African foreign policy
has been undergoing a process of transformation. After an unpromising start in
which a coterie of diplomats, exemplified by Director-General Rusty Evans,
attempted to forestall substantial policy and personnel changes, an extended range of
actors including the Department of Trade and Industry, the Portfolio Committee on
Foreign Aﬀairs and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence has begun to
42 Just over 80 per cent of Czechs voted in favour of membership in the June 2003 referendum.
43 Peter Schraeder, Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
Some diplomatic eﬀorts were made, particularly by Pik Botha, Foreign Minister between 1980 and
1994, to establish apartheid South Africa’s legitimate credentials. But in Africa, only Malawi and
the Côte d’Ivoire recognised the apartheid state. Elsewhere, South Africa maintained cordial
relations with Israel, particularly after 1973, as it did with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s Iran.
Some states, among them the United States, Britain and West Germany, established a working
relationship with Pretoria, but by and large, the apartheid regime was an outcast, excluded from
multilateral bodies and ostracised by most of the international community.
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contribute in a meaningful sense to the foreign policymaking process. The scope of
South Africa’s external missions has increased: forty-three new embassies have been
created since 1994, over half of them now staﬀed by black South Africans.
‘Second-track’ diplomacy has seen South African think-tanks and policy institutes
like the Foundation for Global Dialogue, the African Centre for the Constructive
Resolution of Disputes and the Centre for Conflict Resolution play a role in
democratisation in Nigeria, Congo, Sudan and Burundi. Overall, foreign policy has
become associated with a broad interventionism that has seen the new look SANDF
take part in a number of engagements abroad. In 1999, the government became
actively involved in conflict resolution in Burundi and in 2002, South African troops
were sent to Congo to safeguard its fragile peace settlement. South Africa has also
played an energetic role in conflicts in the Comoros Islands, Rwanda, Madagascar,
the Ivory Coast and Sudan. Between 1994 and 2000, South Africa signed seventy
multilateral treaties, joined the WTO and rejoined both the OAU and the Common-
wealth. The same period saw South Africa host a welter of international conferences,
including the annual meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the UN World
Conference on Racism and the World Summit on Sustainable Development. All this
is crowned by President Mbeki’s call for an African Renaissance, which has seen
South Africa actively promote democracy and human rights around the continent
and take the lead in international organisations like the African Union. In Greg Mills
words, South Africa has gone from being ‘a pariah to a participant’.44 Once the
world’s ‘polecat’, South Africa now plays an active part in a number of international
agencies, standing as a pivot between north and south and as a standard bearer for
developing nations.45
From utopia to normalcy
Scholars often lament the lack of a utopian vision or grand plan in the revolutions of
1989 and after. In these cases, it is argued, revolutionaries had no world vision to
match the dreams of equality and liberty espoused in France and Russia. But, as
noted above, demanding that every revolution conjures a new world vision as an
essential criteria for its definition would disqualify almost every case from being
labelled as a revolution. All revolutionaries have looked to the past as much as the
present, let alone to a vision of a future utopia, to legitimise their revolt. Revolutions
are at once both ruptures and restorations, Janus-faced processes which as Bar-
rington Moore puts it, ‘march into the future facing resolutely backwards’.46 In this
sense, there is no contradiction in labelling the events of 1989 and after as ‘rectifying
revolutions’ or indeed, as negotiated revolutions.47 Revolutionaries in 1989 followed
their predecessors by looking backwards as well as forwards, to 1688 and 1848 as well
44 Greg Mills (ed.), From Pariah to Participant (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International
Aﬀairs, 1994).
45 This shift should not be seen as an even nor as an unproblematic process. For a fuller analysis of
South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, see Chris Alden and Garth Le Pere, South Africa’s
Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Revival? (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2003).
46 In Kumar, Revolutionary Ideas and Ideals, p. 166.
47 The term ‘rectifying revolutions’ was coined by Jürgen Habermas.
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as to 1789 and 1917. Furthermore, there was something novel about the role of ideas
in 1989 – the deliberate lack of a utopian vision; what Václav Havel calls ‘anti-
ideology’ and György Konrád ‘antipolitics’. Central and Eastern Europeans wanted
to return to Europe, to catch up with the West, to become what they perceived as
normal again. Precisely what they did not want was the autocracy that flows from
fidelity to a grand vision or theory.
By eschewing the obedience to a particular ideology which served to legitimise
many of the excesses carried out in the name of revolutions in the past, negotiated
revolutions avoid the patterns of domestic and international terror, counter-
revolution, autarchy and war that have characterised many previous revolutions.
Negotiated revolutions seek to build a new order without the despotic coercive
control exerted by their predecessors but one that boasts a commitment to
democratic political relations defined by a written, liberal constitution; regular, free
elections competed over by a range of political parties; the separation of the state
from the security apparatus and the military; and an internationalist perspective
which demands an active role in relevant international institutions and organisations.
Economically, negotiated revolutions undergo programmes of liberalisation and
privatisation which open up the domestic market to foreign competition, establish an
independent financial sector and maintain trade policies in keeping with prevailing
international regimes. Socially, negotiated revolutions foster a relatively open
environment featuring a free media and education system; enshrine equality of race,
gender and religion in law; and develop a means by which to reconcile past injustices,
usually by way of a truth commission.
Truth commissions are perhaps the best means of assessing the novel role of
ideology in negotiated revolutions. All revolutions require some mechanism for
dealing with the injustices of the old order, a means of moving from old to new which
establishes the authority and legitimacy of the incoming regime while also providing
an outlet for people’s sense of outrage and thirst for revenge. In the past, these needs
were satiated through a mixture of firing squads, guillotines, show trials, gulags and
purges. Negotiated revolutions, founded on principles of restorative rather than
punitive or retributive justice, institute truth commissions as an innovative way of
dealing with these issues.48 The character and outcomes of truth commissions closely
reflect the nature of both the polity and the particular society within which they take
place: secretive and repressed in Chile, kept firmly behind closed doors by an old
guard determined to cling on to power; messy and violent in South Africa, a
perambulating Pandora’s box held in the full gaze of a disorientated public; uncertain
and limited in the Czech Republic, where the main body of evidence was police files
held over from the communist era. There is therefore no single route map for societies
escaping from, or seeking to escape from, entrenched conflict. In South Africa, a
truth commission has been a valuable symbolic tool representing the birth of a
new nation; in Chile, it was only the arrest of the former dictator in 1998 which
moved the transition on apace; in the Czech Republic, a flawed law – lustrace – has
48 This is not to say that truth commissions originate with negotiated revolutions. In fact, they first
appeared during the 1980s in Latin America as a means of hearing from, and compensating,
families of those who had ‘disappeared’ under military dictatorships. As they have developed, truth
commissions have become far more complex, reaching their apogee, at least to date, in South
Africa.
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failed to provide a sense of resolution between an autocratic past and a democratic
future.49
What these processes share is a commitment to the generation of a foundational
narrative for a new nation out of which a collective rather than a disjointed history
can emerge. As such, they fulfil the age-old need to provide an outlet for the victims
of the old regime, a moment when innocent people get the chance to tell stories which
would otherwise go unheard, a weapon of the weak turned back against seemingly
almighty oppressors. But at the same time, they perform this task in a novel
fashion – by trading truth for punishment. For all their flaws, TRCs represent central
elements in the ideological diﬀerentiation of negotiated revolutions from past
examples of revolutionary change. They are one element of the attempt to reconcile
what were apparently intractable diﬀerences. As such, TRCs are a crucial step in the
argument which states that real conflicts and social cleavages cannot, nor should they
be, emasculated behind a façade of consensus but that conflict by civil war, firing
squad or show trial is disastrous for a nation’s future wellbeing. For that reason and
that reason alone, they represent the distinctiveness of negotiated revolutions from
the modern revolutions of the past two centuries or so.
From festivals of violence to festivals of hope
In the modern era, revolutions have been seen as festivals of violence, fights to the
finish in which one side vanquishes the other, an ultimate victory in which a new
order is instituted while the ashes of the old are still burning. Of course, history tells
a somewhat diﬀerent story: the 1789 Revolution ushered in a decade of domestic
strife in France, opening up the way to dictatorship and war; the Bolshevik
Revolution was followed by a four-year civil war in which foreign armies and their
proxies fought fiercely with the Red Army; the two-stage Chinese Revolution was
separated by a battle for domestic hegemony which lasted for three decades. Even
after these revolutions, the new regimes struggled to impose their authority on their
wider societies, hence Robespierre’s Terror, Stalin’s forced collectivisation and
49 Lustrace was flawed in numerous ways. First, the investigation commission set up by the law relied
on secret police documentation which many argued was incomplete, could have been doctored to
appease bosses or implicate enemies, and failed to diﬀerentiate between formal informers and those
who unwittingly helped the security services. Second, the law did not exempt anyone on the grounds
of mitigating circumstances, even torture, threat or blackmail. Third, lustrace presupposed guilt,
requiring the accused to prove their innocence rather than accusers to establish culpability. This
allowed lustrace to become both a powerful political tool and a moral condemnation of people who
were, at least initially, unable to defend themselves. Names of people under investigation were
regularly leaked to the press, only later for them to be found innocent. In the most famous, or
perhaps infamous case, Jan Kavan, a dissident who had spent much of the communist period in
exile abroad claimed that he had no knowledge that he had been targeted by the secret police, had
been denied access to crucial files and prevented from presenting witnesses. Kavan won his appeal
and later became Foreign Minister, but not before comparing lustrace to McCarthyism, declaring
‘we are at the top of the league at witch-hunts’. For more on this, see Nagle and Mahr, Democracy
and Democratisation; Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in New
Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); and
Kieran Williams, ‘Lustration as the Securitization of Democracy in Czechoslovakia and the Czech
Republic’, Journal of Communist Societies and Transition Politics, 19:4 (2003).
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purges, and Mao’s Cultural Revolution, all attempts to shore up revolutionary
regimes from opposition at home and abroad, real and imagined.50
Negotiated revolutions oﬀer a radically diﬀerent conceptualisation of violence
than past examples of revolution. Negotiated transformations are not violent fights
to the finish but relatively peaceful processes in which deals are struck between
revolutionaries and their adversaries. First, overt violence is contained – both sides
seek a settlement of previously irreconcilable diﬀerences without recourse to coercive
power, although, of course, these conflicts featured varying degrees of overt violence
leading up to the revolutionary dénouement itself. Second, violence tends to appear
in latent, structural form rather than as an explicit policy tool. Structural violence
emits an unfortunate residue for the incoming regime; the social legacy imparted by
authoritarian rule on the new order remains a diﬃcult and pressing issue for Czech,
South African and Chilean leaders. Yet this is a long way removed from the
divisiveness and rupture experienced by past revolutionary states. Third, the
outcome of the revolutionary struggle is not the battle between revolutionary and
counter-revolutionary forces common to previous revolutions. This is because the
proselytising vision oﬀered by these states is one rooted in the underlying principles,
norms and practices of the international system itself: support for multilateralism and
international organisations; a liberal view of progress; and a concern for welfare and
development. In this way, negotiated revolutions avoid the extreme levels of violence,
both domestic and international, which have plagued so many revolutions in the
modern era.
This point is exemplified through the example of South Africa. As Pierre du Toit
writes, under apartheid, South Africa was the most repressive society in the world:
three-and-a-half million people were forcibly uprooted from their homes; an
insidious and pervasive ideology of racial superiority denied the rights of nearly
nine-tenths of the population to basic needs, schooling and work; significant groups
in South African society ranging from the church to the medical profession were
complicit in the oppression of their fellow citizens by turning a blind eye or actively
sanctioning police brutality and abuse; discrimination and humiliation were used as
everyday instruments of psychological torture to erode the dignity, self-belief and
security of non-white South Africans.51 The result was a society of violent crime,
rape, drug abuse, alcoholism and family breakdown.
Yet despite these levels of structural violence, South Africa did not experience an
overtly violent overthrow of apartheid. There was no sudden seizure of power in
South Africa, no date when the revolutionary army swept through the streets of
Pretoria. For many participants and observers alike, this lack of a revolutionary
moment and the watering down of opposition demands and goals amounted to a
betrayal of the revolution itself. But such a viewpoint is based on a fallacy, that the
alternative to negotiation was the outright victory of the liberation movement.
Revolutionaries lacked the capacity to win a military victory over the old regime, just
as the old regime could no longer carry on ruling in the same way. It was mutual
dependence and mutual weakness which bought combatants to the negotiating table.
Negotiation oﬀered a route out of impasse, an end to the tyranny of an authoritarian
50 The proclivity of revolutionary regimes to domestic tyranny is evidenced today by Fidel Castro’s
regular crackdowns on domestic dissent in Cuba.
51 For more on this, see Pierre Du Toit, South Africa’s Brittle Peace: The Problem of Post-Settlement
Violence (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).
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system and containment of the excesses of oppressors and freedom fighters alike. But,
by its very nature, the deal struck between adversaries was less than perfect, involving
concessions from both sides of the barricades. This does not diminish the country’s
transformation since 1994. Rather, the containment of violent struggle has generated
an outcome perhaps less dramatic than past examples of revolutionary change, but
also less damaging to the long-term fabric of the country itself.
The crucial point is that, if a negotiated revolution is to succeed, both sides must
renounce violence as a legitimate policy tool. As the old regime tends to retain control
of the coercive apparatus longer than any other means of authority, this decision
is primarily the preserve of the old guard. Hence the concern over the night of
5th October 1988 that the Chilean junta might not accept the result of the plebiscite
which ended its rule, the relief among leaders of the 1989 general strike in the Czech
Republic that the army was not called in to restore order, and the uncertainty among
leading ANC cadres over whether the armed forces would play a neutral role during
the negotiating process and the 1994 elections. In each case, the role of the coercive
apparatus was critical but uncertain. In each case, elites chose not to use the force
available to them.
The lack of a recourse to armed conflict by old regime elites in Chile, South Africa
and the Czech Republic contrasts starkly with the decision by the Chinese politburo
to employ the army against student protesters in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, a
policy which helped to successfully defuse large scale opposition to the regime over
the subsequent decade. It is now common knowledge that in East Germany, Erich
Honecker came close to deploying the armed forces against protesters, until he was
persuaded otherwise by Mikhail Gorbachev among others. In Romania, Nicolae
Ceausescu’s elite force, the Securitate, failed to defend the leadership against a
determined uprising. Neither China nor Romania experienced negotiated revolu-
tions, yet East Germany did. In each case, it was a conjunction of elite action,
domestic opposition and external forces, both structural and agential, which
determined the immediate path of the insurrection. These examples provoke two
main lessons. First, violence and revolution are tied together contingently rather than
by necessity. Second, revolutions do not follow settled, inexorable paths. They are
critical junctures which may lead in any one of a number of directions. At all times,
revolutions are a complex interplay between changing structural conditions and
collective action. One element which diﬀerentiates negotiated revolutions from past
revolutions is that, once the revolutionary situation is in place, actors from both sides
of the barricades choose roundtables rather than guillotines.
From guillotines to roundtables
The great revolutions of the modern era are all marked by a particular event, an icon
which comes to embody the very essence of the revolutionary struggle itself. The
storming of the Bastille, the raid on the Winter Palace and the Long March
undertaken by the remnants of Mao’s army are all revolutionary mementos par
excellence, symbols of the might of the revolutionary struggle and the relative
weakness of the old regime. Negotiated revolutions do not lack for these great
moments. The daily demonstrations in Wenceslas Square and the release of Nelson
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Mandela aptly indicate the emotive appeal of these transformations. Yet while the
central motif of past revolutions has been explicitly associated with armed rebellion,
negotiated revolutions take on a somewhat diﬀerent character – the power of the
masses to be sure, but not that of the mob. Rather, the control of fervour and the
dignity of protest rise above the social context defined by the old regime. Central to
this success is the process of negotiation between old and new elites.
As stated above, revolutions must be relatively quick in order to diﬀerentiate them
from processes of transition and longer-term evolutionary change. This does not rule
out some degree of variation – the whirlwind of talks held in three short weeks in the
Czech Republic seems light years away from the tortuous three years of stop-start
negotiations in South Africa. But what unites these cases with past revolutions is that
the outcomes were neither inevitable nor miraculous, neither the necessary conse-
quence of particular structural alignments nor the intended, rational consequence of
people’s individual’s actions. Negotiated revolutions are marked by uncertainty and
flux, moments when the outcomes were unclear and the path to peaceful resolution
unlikely. As such, these processes serve as powerful examples of the dynamic
interplay between structure and agency, necessity and contingency, cause and
outcome.
Again, a counterfactual helps to clarify this point. In the early 1990s, Burma
(Myanmar) appeared to contain all the necessary ingredients for a negotiated
transformation. The end of the Cold War removed the last vestiges of international
support for the military junta. The regime ruled over an inherently unstable, corrupt,
devalued political order; the economy was in a parlous state; and the atomised social
order shut oﬀ the elite in Rangoon from the views of the general public. Opposition
coalesced around a popular leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who represented a viable
alternative, boasted considerable domestic and international legitimacy, and pos-
sessed the necessary resources with which to challenge the authority of the military
regime. Although some reforms were initiated, including the onset of roundtable
talks, the opposition failed to oust or even significantly dent the authority of the
military regime. In a way reminiscent of how the military junta in Chile successfully
saw oﬀ opposition protests in the early 1980s, Burma’s generals kept a firm grip on
power. Despite displaying the right credentials, neither a transition nor transforma-
tion has taken place in Myanmar over the last decade. This failure serves as a warning
to those who ignore the intricacies of revolutionary processes and who postulate from
the lofty heights aﬀorded by hindsight on the inevitability of historical processes
which, on close inspection, reveal a logic quite removed from their suppositions.
Revolutions, negotiated or otherwise, are an intricate conjunction of historical
context, social conditions and political action.
From tyranny to weakness
In the past, the causes, events and outcomes of revolutions were closely bound up
with the state. First, the revolutionary situation emerged out of a crisis rooted in the
state. Defeat in war, economic collapse and the like served to fatally destabilise the
old regime. Second, revolutionary events were largely ordered around a fight for
control of the state. Third, the revolution was considered to be over in the short term
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when one side seized control of key state apparatus. Finally, in the long term, in order
to shore up their regime from opposition both at home and abroad, revolutionaries
built vast state bureaucracies and armies, exerting domestic authority through
rigorous mechanisms of surveillance and control. As a result, post-revolutionary
states possessed a double strength. In Michael Mann’s terms, they enjoyed both a
considerable infrastructural capacity and a despotic potency, strengths which more
often than not spilled over into tyranny.52
This pattern is not repeated by negotiated revolutions. Like past revolutions,
negotiated revolutions stem from systemic crisis in which the declining legitimacy of
the old regime is of cardinal importance. But at no point does the old regime collapse.
There is no process to mirror the French defeat in the Seven Years War, the Russian
trauma over defeat by Japan in 1905 and the First World War, or the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria for the Chinese. These events fatally undermined the old
regime, providing staging posts in the slide towards a revolutionary situation. But in
negotiated revolutions, both the old regime and belligerents approached the negoti-
ating table from positions of mutual dependence. Neither side in the Czech Republic
or South Africa, nor for that matter in Chile, had any hope of outright victory. It was
the weakness of both sides which compelled them to negotiation.53 The process of the
revolutions themselves is also distinct from the fight over the state common to past
revolutions. Negotiators deal with a set of issues far removed from those which
concerned previous revolutionaries: the make up of transitional bodies, the electoral
process, the role of a constitutional convention and so on. Similarly, the outcomes of
negotiated revolutions fall some way short of the tyranny which marred revolution-
ary states in the past. Because negotiated revolutionaries seek to ‘catch up’ with
democratic states, they sign up to a raft of international treaties, institutions and
ordinances which restrict their freedom of manoeuvre, particularly over fiscal policy.
The negotiations themselves circumscribe the potential for radical change, witnessed
for example by the sunset clauses and power-sharing agreements which formed a
central part of the negotiations in South Africa. Because they face neither substantial
domestic nor external opposition, revolutionaries have no need to build up mass
armies or extend coercive control around the country. In fact, in all three cases,
incoming governments sought to contain rather than expand the authority of the
armed forces and security apparatus. Such revolutionaries have no desire to export
their revolution abroad by force. Equally, no counter-revolutionary force is
unleashed to contain or overthrow the new regimes. Negotiated revolutions oﬀer no
proselytising vision but that oﬀered by the dominant constituents of world politics
themselves. As such, they serve to strengthen the liberal international order.
Whither revolution?
In the contemporary world, while citizens of what Robert Cooper calls the
‘post-modern world’ enjoy what seems to be a perpetual peace, around a billion
52 For more on this, see Michael Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins,
Mechanisms and Results’, European Journal of Sociology, 25:2 (1984).
53 In this sense, there was a seemingly permanent state of what Charles Tilly (pace Leon Trotsky) calls
‘dual sovereignty’. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).
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people, or one in six of the world’s population, live in countries mired in civil war or
at high risk from falling into such conflict.54 Neither of these worlds is without its
problems. In advanced market democracies, uncertainty, social dislocation and the
diﬃculties associated with managing freedom – what the novelist Monica Ali calls
the ‘limits of autonomy’ – all present their concerns for policymakers.55 In Cooper’s
‘pre-modern’ world, poverty, disease and increasing inequalities generate friction
which all too often spills over into open conflict.56 At its heart, therefore, modernity
appears to be an inherently contradictory process, one marked by greater aﬄuence
but also rising inequality; secularisation but also fundamentalism; global forms of
governance alongside a drive to local autonomy.57 As numerous scholars, among
them Stuart Hall and Anthony Giddens, point out, modernity has fashioned a world
without certainties, one in which people must get by without either the absolute
values or the social institutions that sustained order in the past. Given the incongruity
and uncertainty that characterises modernity, a continuation of the constitutive role
played by processes of radical change seems assured.
The part to be played by negotiated revolutions in this story is one born out of
both hope and challenge. In the first instance, negotiated revolutions demonstrate the
possibility of states ‘catching up’ with the West in a way which would have been
recognisable to Trotsky almost a century ago. On the other hand, negotiated
revolutions contest some of the core features of world politics, not least the role
played by unfettered markets. As Karl Polanyi pointed out over half a century ago,
a market economy cannot succeed without a ‘market society’ – all economic acts are
necessarily embedded in social structures.58 All too often, states undergoing negoti-
ated revolutions have seen a commitment by international actors to establishing free
markets fail to be matched by a nurturing of the social and political institutions
which are germane to the functioning of a consolidated market democracy. Heeding
Polanyi’s lesson as to the necessity of nurturing a ‘market society’ alongside a
‘market economy’ is critical if international agencies are to deal more eﬀectively with
societies facing similar pressures and going through comparable processes in years to
come.
Above all else, it is clear that the management system of contemporary world
politics, whether that be the bequest of an imperial power or hegemon, a coalition of
great powers or multilateral centres of governance, needs to take ongoing pressures
for radical change seriously. The example of South Africa, one of the most
remarkable testimonies to the politics of the possible of this age, or any other,
reminds us of what can be achieved through human agency. Even in the most
inhospitable of domestic environments, belligerents convened a common future
based on mutual respect for what appeared to be inalienable diﬀerences. Not
everything in South Africa has changed – nor has it done so in previous revolutions.
But in South Africa, a radically new order has been instituted which bears little
54 Figures taken from Paul Collier, ‘How to Stem Civil Wars: It’s the Economy, Stupid’, International
Herald Tribune, 21 May 2003, p. 13.
55 For more on this, see Geoﬀ Mulgan, Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World (London:
Chatto & Windus, 1997).
56 Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order (London: Demos, 2000).
57 On the double nature of modernity and globalisation, see Ian Clark, Globalisation and
Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997).
58 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1944).
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resemblance to its predecessor. Contrast the case of South Africa with the current
state of aﬀairs in West Asia, particularly in Iraq, and it becomes clear that there is no
inevitable set of conditions which dictate that future transformations will be carried
out along relatively peaceful lines. Rather, the prospect and actuality of violent
conflict remains one of depressing familiarity to people all around the world. In
Myanmar, Cuba, North Korea, Turkmenistan, Togo and other such societies,
authoritarian regimes hold an unsustainable grip on their publics. If the events of
1989 and after tell us anything, it is that even the most apparently unyielding of
systems is inherently unstable. The essential question of our times is, will this
instability be resolved through the pitched battles and firing squads common to times
of yore or via the roundtables and negotiated settlements which oﬀer an alternative
path out of seemingly intractable conflicts?
Negotiated revolutions are reminders of the persistent capacity of world historical
processes, inherent in human agency, to surprise: there were few academics, activists
or mystics who foresaw the collapse of communism, the end of apartheid or the
overthrow of the Pinochet regime. As such, it does not seem out of place to see
negotiated revolutions as a contemporary form of what E. H. Carr calls a ‘realistic
utopia’: the promotion of peaceful change rooted in the conditions of the age, yet
which carry with them the possibility of progress.59 Over upcoming years, we will see
whether negotiated revolutions traverse the recalcitrant line between idealism and
realism, avoiding the perils of an overly optimistic, naı¨ve altruism on the one hand
and the crudeness of a raw struggle for power on the other. Either way, it is clear that
the age of revolutions is not over. The debate which has raged since the time of Paine
and Burke over the two faces of revolution remains one of immense significance to
the contemporary world.
59 Unfortunately, Carr’s vision of a world in which ‘British policy must take into account the welfare
of Lille or Düsseldorf or Lodz as well as the welfare of Oldham or Jarrow’ looks unrealistic even
today, 65 years after it was first proposed. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis: An Introduction to
the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1930), p. 219.
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